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Law Summary
Get Your Dead Hands Off Me:
Beneficiaries' Right to
Terminate or Modify a Trust
Under the Uniform Trust Code
I. INTRODUCTION
Known as "perhaps the most distinctive achievement of English lawyers,'"
trusts have emerged as a favored means of estate planning, wealth management,
and charitable giving in recent years.2 A trust is a property management
mechanism in which a manager, called a trustee, holds legal title to the trust
property, and owes a fiduciary duty to a beneficiary, who holds title to the
property in equity.3 The requirements for establishing a trust are relatively

1. Gerry W. Beyer, Simplification of Inter Vivos Trust Instruments: From

Incorporationby Reference to the Uniform CustodialTrust Act andBeyond, 32 S.TEX.
L. REv. 203, 206 (1991).
2. ROGER W. ANDERSEN, UNDERSTANDING TRUSTS AND ESTATES § 2, at 9 (2d ed.

1999).
3. Restatement (Second) of Trusts describes a trust as follows:
A trust, as the term is used in the Restatement of this subject, when not
qualifiedbythe word "charitable," "resulting" or "constructive," is a fiduciary
relationship with respect to property, subjecting the person by whom the title
to the property is held to equitable duties to deal with the property for the
benefit of another person, which arises as a result of a manifestation of an
intention to create it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 2 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF

TRUSTS § 2 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996) (stating "[a trust] is a fiduciary relationship
with respect to property, arising as aresult ofamanifestation of an intention to create that
relationship and subjecting the person who holds title to the property to duties to deal
with it for the benefit of charity or for one or more persons, at least one of whom is not
the sole trustee").
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uncomplicated,4 making trusts a valuable and straightforward estate planning
device.'
Private express trusts are useful to settlors for numerous reasons.6 Inter
vivos trusts, created and funded during the settlor's lifetime,7 allow the settlor to
control his or her property while allowing portions of the corpus8 to pass to
beneficiaries during either the settlor's life or following his or her death.9 A
major advantage of the inter vivos trust is that it is not subject to probate. 0
Conversely, testamentary trusts" are created by will and, therefore, subject to
probate. 2 Nevertheless, testamentary trusts enable a settlor to provide for the
needs of incompetent or minor beneficiaries after the settlor's death' 3 and are
somewhat easier to establish than are inter vivos trusts.' 4 Additionally, trusts of

4. The creation of a trust generally requires that: (1) the settlor has the capacity to
create a trust; (2) the settlor indicates an intention to create a trust; and (3) the trust has
a definite beneficiary. UNIF. TRUST CODE § 402(a)(l)-(3) (2000) [hereinafter UTC].
Furthermore, in most states, inter vivos trusts have no execution requirements and the
court has no continuing role in administration. See also GEORGE G. BOGERT & GEORGE
T. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1 (2d ed. rev. 1992) (stating the
requirements of a trust-as: (1) an intent that the property be held for the benefit of
another; (2) the existence of at least one beneficiary who may enforce the trust terms; and
(3) an existing or ascertainable property interest).
5. Professor Beyer has argued, however, that legislatively- and judicially-imposed
rules place trusts "beyond the reach of many people who would benefit from their
prudent use." Beyer, supranote 1, at 206; cf.ANDERSEN, supranote 2, § 2, at 9 (stating
that "[b]ecause trusts are so flexible, they are the most useful single estate planning
device").
6. ANDERSEN, supra note 2, § 11, at 91. For a discussion of the advantages and
disadvantages of revocable trusts as estate planning tools, see JESSE DUKEMINIER &
STANLEY M. JOHANSON, WILLS, TRUSTS AND ESTATES 379-87 (6th ed. 2000).
7. A settlor is "one who creates a trust.... One who furnishes the consideration
(res) for the creation of a trust." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 956 (7th ed. 1999).
Conversely, a testator is "[o]ne who makes or has made a testament or will [or] one who
dies leaving a will." Id. at 1028.
8. Corpusis defined as "the principal sum, or capital, as distinguished from interest
or income. [It is t]he main body or principal of a trust." Id. at 239.
9. ANDERSEN, supra note 2, § 11, at 92.
10. ANDERSEN, supranote 2, § 11, at 92.
11. A testamentary trust is "[a] trust that is created by a will and takes effect when
the settlor (testator) dies. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999); see also
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 17 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 53 cmt. a (1959).
12. ANDERSEN, supra note 2, § 11, at 92-93.
13. See ANDERSEN, supranote 2, § 13, at 109-13.
14. ANDERSEN, supra note 2, § 13, at 109-13.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11
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any type, in certain circumstances, can result in estate, gift, or income tax
5
savings.
Although the advantages of using trusts are well established, the law
governing the extent to which trust provisions can be altered is not. 6 The
growing popularity of trusts in recent years has elevated the importance of this
issue, 7 but the legislative response has been sluggish and incomplete.
In 1983, Missouri enacted a statutory provision, Missouri Revised Statutes
Section 456.590.2, that authorizes beneficiaries to terminate trusts.'8 Unlike the
majority position expressed in the Claflin doctrine, 9 the Missouri statute is
devoid of deference to the settlor's intent and, instead, requires a court to find
that proposed alterations, including termination, benefit beneficiaries who are
unable to represent themselves in a proceeding, such as those who are
unascertained or incompetent. 20 The scope of the Missouri statute recently has
gained heightened importance for a number of reasons. First, the manner in
which Americans distribute their wealth is changing, and trusts are a flexible
wealth management tool.2' Second, the Rule Against Perpetuities' is losing
favor and already has been repealed by statute in some states, including

15. See generally JOHN J. REGAN ET AL., TAX AND ESTATE PLANNING FOR THE
ELDERLY ch. 17 (2001).

16. See UTC prefatory note; infra notes 97-113 and accompanying text.
17. See Ronald Chester, Modification and Termination of Trusts in the 21st
Century: The Uniform Trust Code Leads a Quiet Revolution, 35 REAL PROP. PROB. &
TR. J.697, 700 (2001).
18. The relevant provision of the Missouri statute provides:
When all of the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent, the court
may, upon finding that such variation will benefit the disabled, minor, unborn
and unascertained beneficiaries, vary the terms of a private trust so as to
reduce or eliminate the interests of some beneficiaries and increase those of
others, to change the times or amounts of payments and distributions to
beneficiaries, or to provide for termination ofthe trust at a time earlier or later
than that specified by the terms.
Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
19. The crux of the Claflindoctrine is that the trust should not be terminated where
the change would breach the settlor's intent in creating the trust. Claflin v. Claflin, 20
N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889); see infra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
20. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
21. See Chester, supra note 17, at 698 (stating that recent developments have led
to accumulations of wealth and are leading people to create family dynasties, often

through trusts).
22. The Rule Against Perpetuities states: "No interest is good unless it must vest,
if at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the
interest." J. GRAY, THE RULE AGAINST PERPETUITS § 201, at 191 (4th ed. 1942).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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Missouri.' This change, however, flags concern that, where a trust can exist
indefinitely, it becomes increasingly likely that the settlor's original intent will
become inconsistent with the beneficiaries' needs. This risk remains a
consideration in light of the limited case law on the topic and the nebulous
language of the Missouri provision. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the
development of the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") 4 addresses these issues with
greater precision and, if adopted in Missouri, would obviate the need for
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2.
This Law Summary provides a discussion of beneficiaries' right to
terminate or modify a trust and speculates on the impact adoption of the Code
will have on this area of the law in Missouri. This analysis is particularly
important, given Missouri's deviation from the majority approach to trust
termination or modification in the past.
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Discussion of a beneficiary's power to modify or terminate a trust requires
a two-tiered approach.' First, traditional doctrine has required the unanimous
consent of the beneficiaries.26 Although this requirement seems innocent enough
on its face, complications arise when the trust was designed to benefit
27
individuals who are not yet born (i.e., grandchildren) or who are incompetent.

23. South Dakota, Wisconsin, and Rhode Island were among the first states to
abolish the rule. Chester, supranote 17, at 714 (citing R.I. GEN. LAWS § 34-11-38 (Supp.
2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-5-4 (Michie 1997); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 700.16 (West

1981 & Supp. 2000)); see also Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.236 (2000). The Missouri
provision does not abolish the Rule Against Perpetuities in all circumstances. Mo. REV.
STAT. § 456.236 (Supp. 2001). Section 456.236.3.1 extinguishes the rule as to trusts
created on or after August 28, 2001. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.236.3.1 (Supp. 2001).
24. Several states are expected to adopt the Uniform Trust Code ("UTC") in 2002.
David M. English, The 2000 Uniform Trust Code, Address at the FFIEC 2001 ASSET
Management Conference (Aug. 7, 2001).
25. Modification of the trust term necessarily includes termination; therefore, the
same body oflaw applies to both principles. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 63
cmt. g (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001). The UTC uses the terms synonymously. UTC
prefatory note.
26. The Restatement (Second) provides:
(1) Except as stated in Subsection (2), if all of the beneficiaries of a trust
consent and none of them is under an incapacity, they can compel the
termination of the trust. (2) If the continuance of the trust is necessary to
carry out a material purpose of the trust, the beneficiaries cannot compel its
termination.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959).

27. Determining how to protect the interests of beneficiaries who are unborn or
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11
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The second requirement, and the one that has presented the most difficulty for
courts and petitioners alike, is that the proposed modification may not be
achieved without the settlor's consent if doing so would violate the material
purpose of the trust.28 Under the conventional American rule, courts defer to the
settlor's intent and preserve the integrity of the trust regardless of the
beneficiaries' desires.29 After nearly a century ofadherence to the majority rule,
however, Missouri established the opposite approach of giving effect to the
beneficiaries' desires, at least to a limited extent.3 °
A. The Development of the American Majority Position
The majority position on the role of a settlor's intent in trust modification
has fluctuated between deference and indifference during the past 160 years.
Early American jurisprudence was based upon Saundersv. Vautier,3' an English
case in which the court allowed the beneficiary access to the corpus four years
earlier than the trust instrument authorized. 32 The court dissolved the trust and
awarded the balance to the beneficiary, stating that delaying payment of the
corpus would have been a logical approach only if the settlor's motivation had
been to withhold funds until the beneficiary reached the age of majority.33
Finding no such motivation and asserting that the interest belonged to the
beneficiary alone, the court determined that the restriction on the trust was
arbitrary and ruled in favor ofthe beneficiary. 34 The gravaman of this rule is the
alienability ofproperty rights, which is evident in the courts' hesitance to enforce
a rule that constrains individuals' ability to dispose oftheir property in whatever

unascertained has presented a continuing problem for the courts. In Hatch v. Riggs
NationalBank,361 F.2d 559, 565 (D.D.C. 1966), the United States District Court for the
District of Columbia remedied this dilemma by appointing a guardian ad litem to
represent the secondary beneficiaries' interests. Missouri recently utilized this approach
in both In re Trust ofNitsche,46 S.W.2d 682,683 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001) and Hamerstrom
v. Union Bank of Kansas City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). Both

Tennessee and Californiahave rejected the appointment of a guardian ad litem in various
circumstances. See Conservatorship of Hart, 279 Cal. Rptr. 249, 260 (Ct. App. 1991);
Alcott v. Union Planter's Nat'l Bank, 686 S.W.2d 79, 83-85 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984).
28. RESTATEMENT(SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337(2) (1959); see also Claflin v. Claflin,
20 N.E. 454, 455-56 (Mass. 1889).
29. Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456.
30. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
31. Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841).
32. Id.
33. Id.

34. See GEORGEG. BOGERT&
1977).

GEORGET.BOGERT, LAW OF TRUSTS §

152(6th ed.
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manner they chose, no matter how imprudent.35 Additionally, the courts have
sought to avoid the effect of the settlor's "dead hand"'36 controlling the
disbursement of funds long after death or after adherence to the trust terms
becomes impossible or impracticable.37 Under this approach, if the beneficiaries
did not elect to terminate the trust, and the instrument itself did not specify a
terminating event, the Rule Against Perpetuities" controlled the longevity of the
39

trust.

Saunders epitomized the notion of freely alienable property interests and
represented the majority rule in the United States for almost fifty years.' In
1889, however, the Massachusetts Supreme Court reached the opposite
conclusion in its landmark decision Claflin v. Claflin.4 In Claflin, the trust
instrument allotted $30,000 to the petitioner, Adelbert Claflin, in three
installments of $10,000 payable on his twenty-first, twenty-fifth, and thirtieth
birthdays.42 In a brief-but-exhaustive opinion, the court recognized the
favorableness of alienable property interests.43 Further, the court acknowledged

35. English courts unfailingly have held that the settlor cannot make the
beneficiaries' interest inalienable by them. See Peter J. Wiedenbeck, Missouri'sRepeal
of the Claflin Doctrine-New View of the Policy AgainstPerpetuities,50 MO. L. REV.
805, 808 (1985) (citing A. SCOTr, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 337 (3d ed. 1967)).
Nevertheless, American law may have played a small part in English jurisprudence
regarding the courts' jurisdiction over modification of trust terms. Professor Chester
noted that, between 1841 and the late 1950s, English courts were hesitant to exercise
statutory authority to "allow wholesale variation" oftrust terms. Chester, supranote 17,
at 711-12. He concluded that "[o]ne might surmise that between the time of Saunders
and the late 1950s, some of America's 'settlor's intent' jurisprudence had crept into
English law." Chester, supranote 17, at 711-12.
36. See Chester, supra note 17, at 714.
37. See Chester, supra note 17, at 714.
38. See Chester, supra note 17, at 710.
39. Chester, supranote 17, at 720.
40. Missouri's version of the Saunders rule is exhibited in Evans v. Rankin, 44
S.W.2d 644 (Mo. 1931), in which the court held that the consent of all competent
beneficiaries was sufficient to modify a trust.
41. 20 N.E. 454 (Mass. 1889). However, the Saundersrule remained in effect in
a small minority of states. See Spooner v. Dunlap, 180 A. 256 (N.H.1935); Newlin v.
Girard Trust Co., 174 A. 479 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1934).
42. Claflin, 20 N.E. at 455.
43. The Claflin court also noted that the absence of a spendthrift provision does not
necessarily indicate that the settlor was willing to allow the trust to be dissolved on the
beneficiary's whim. The court stated:
It is true that the plaintiff's interest is alienable by him, and can be taken by
his creditors to pay his debts, but it does not follow because the testator has
not imposed all possible restrictions that the restrictions which he has
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11
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that the interest in question belonged solely to the petitioner." Nonetheless, the
settlor's intent prevailed over the beneficiary's desires to terminate the trust
prematurely on the grounds that, because no circumstances had arisen that
necessitated the dissolution of the trust,45 there was "no good reason the intent
of the settlor should not be carried out."'
The court concluded that the
beneficiary's situation was that which the settlor effectively envisioned, stating
that the settlor's "intentions ought to be carried out, unless they contravene some
positive rule of law, or are against public policy."'47 Finding that the restrictions
set forth in the trust's distributive provisions were not offensive to a positive rule
of law or public policy, the court gave effect to the settlor's original intent.'

imposed should not be carried into effect.
Id. at 456.
The issue of the role of spendthrift provisions in determining the settlor's intent is
discussed at greater length infra notes 49, 104-09, 131-32, and accompanying text.
44. Claflin, 20 N.E. at 455.
45. The court, as opposed to the beneficiaries, may alter the trust's terms where
events have occurred that change the circumstances surrounding the trust's creation.
RESTATEMENT(SECOND)OFTRUSTS § 167 (1959). TheRestatement describes the courts'
power to alter the administrative provisions of a trust as follows:
The court will direct or permit the trustee to deviate from a term of the trust
if owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by him
compliance would defeat or substantially impair the accomplishment of the
purposes of the trust, the court may direct or... permit the trustee to do acts
which are not authorized or are forbidden by the terms of the trust.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959).

This is commonly known as the changed circumstances doctrine or equitable
deviation. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 167 (1959). The distinction here is

that, although courts traditionally could alter the administrative provisions due to
changed circumstances, they could not alter the dispositive provisions for the same
reason. See Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank in Kansas City, 291 S.W.2d 178, 183 (Mo.
1956) (stating "[t]he power to authorize deviations is exercised, primarily, in matters of
administration and does not extend to the extinction or reduction of the interest of the
other beneficiaries"). The scope of the courts' power to modify or terminate trust terms
is beyond the reach of this Law Summary. However, the UTC, if adopted, would
authorize courts to amend administrative or dispositive provisions, orto terminate atrust
due to unanticipated circumstances, while being mindful of the settlor's original intent.
UTC § 412(a).
46. Claflin, 20 N.E. at 456.
47. Id.
48. Professor Chester has noted that the test that has been adopted by a majority
of American jurisdictions differs in substance from what the Claflin court actually held.
Chester, supra note 17, at 717. The Claflin test is frequently articulated as follows: "a
trust cannot be terminated prior to the time fixed for termination, even though all of the
beneficiaries consent, if termination would be contrary to a material purpose of the
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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This approach evolved into what has become known as the "material purpose"
doctrine, which enumerates the purposes considered to be the essence of a trust.
Pursuant to this doctrine, a trust could not be terminated if:(1) it contained a
spendthrift provision;49 (2) the settlor specified the age at which the beneficiary
was to receive his or her disbursement; (3) the trust instrument gave the trustee
total discretion; or (4) the trust was created for the sole purpose of supporting the
beneficiary. 0

B. MissouriAdopts Claflin
Missouri adopted the Claflin approach in Thomson v. UnionNationalBank
in Kansas City"' and applied it to the fullest extent even though there was
arguably a "good reason" to deviate from the trust terms.s2 In Thomson, the

settlor." Chester, supranote 17, at 717 (citing DUKEMINIER & JOHANSON, supranote 6,
at 854); see also Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,
435 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
The Restatement (Second) does not explicitly describe what is meant by material
purpose. The Restatement (Third), however, contains the following language:
Material purposes are not readily to be inferred. A finding of such a purpose
generally requires some showing of a particular concern or objective on the
part ofthe settlor, such as concern with regard to a beneficiary's management
skills, judgment, or level of maturity. Thus, a court may look for some
circumstantial or other evidence indicating that the trust arrangement
represented to the settlor more than a method of allocating the benefits of
property among multiple intended beneficiaries, or a means of offering to the
beneficiaries (but not imposing on them) a particular advantage. Sometimes,
of course, the very nature or design of a trust suggests its protective nature or
some other material purpose.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
49. Simply stated, a spendthrift trust is one in which the trust property is not
assignable, attachable, or otherwise alienable to the beneficiary's creditors. SeeBLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1518 (7th ed. 1999); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS §
337 cmt. 1(1959). The Restatement (Second) states:
If by the terms of the trust or by statute the interest of one or more of the
beneficiaries is made alienable by him.., the trust will not be terminated
while such alienable interest still exists, although all of the beneficiaries
desire to terminate it or one beneficiary acquires the whole beneficial interest
and desires to terminate it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 cmt. 1 (1959).
50. See Chester, supranote 17, at 717.
51. 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956).
52. Id. at 182. Although changed circumstances is a doctrine in and of itself that
a court may employ to alter the administrative provisions of a trust, a change in
circumstances is frequently the basis for the beneficiaries' petition to modify the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11
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settlor established a trust in 1913 for the primary purpose of providing income
to his wife after his death. 3 The beneficiaries argued that the settlor did not
anticipate economic changes that resulted in the depreciation54 of the bonds held
in trust.55 The court, in rejecting the beneficiaries' request, seemingly reduced
the decision to modify or terminate to a matter of degree. It stated that the
"settlor's primary purposes have not been so defeated or so substantially
impairedby changed economic conditions that the trustee should no longer be
required to strictly conform to the directions of the trust and the settlor's explicit
desires."' 6 Here, the beneficiaries presented a meritorious argument for
termination or modification of the archaic trust instrument, which the court,
nevertheless, rejected based upon an expansive interpretation of the material
purpose doctrine.
Although, as a general principle, English law traditionally has deferred to
a beneficiary's desire, confusion about a statutory provision governing the
court's jurisdiction over trust investments led to a disjointedbody of case law in
the 1940s and 1950s.5" The need for uniformity contributed to the passage of the
Variation of Trusts Act in 1958.19 The Act's language conferred upon the courts

dispositive provisions or to terminate the trust. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS
§§ 166-67 (1959). Hence, the changed circumstances language often appears in cases
where the beneficiaries have petitioned a court formodification ofdispositive provisions
due to a change in life circumstances of one or all ofthe beneficiaries. The question then
before the court is whether alteration or termination is consistent with the settlor's
material purpose. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 337 (1959).
53. Thomson, 291 S.W.2d at 183.
54. The settlor funded the trust with $60,000 at its inception in 1913 with the
instruction that the trust income be paid to his wife with equal parts ofthe corpus divided
among his children when they reached the age of forty. Id. at 179. The trust income
varied from $3,600 to $4,800 annually until about 1949 when the income was $1,332.
Id.at 180. The income was similarly low in 1951 and 1952. Id. Mrs. Thomson and her
children (each ofwhom was a beneficiary) brought the instant action in 1953. Id.at 180.
55. Id. at 183.
56. Id. at 184 (emphasis added).
57. The distinctions among the facts in the Claflin, Saunders, and Thomson
decisions are worthy ofmention. The beneficiaries in Claflin andSaunderswere young
men who asserted that the wealth due them was being arbitrarily withheld. Claflin v.
Claflin, 20 N.E. 454, 456 (Mass. 1889); Saunders v. Vautier, Cr. & Ph. 240 (1841).
Thomson's plaintiff, however, was a widow whose source of income was not entirely
stable. Thomson, 291 S.W.2d at 180. Although the thrust of the Claflin doctrine is to
honor the settlor's intent, such was arguably not the result in Thomson.
58. See Chester, supranote 17, at 712.
59. The Variation of Trusts Act reads, in pertinent part:
(1) Where property, whetherreal orpersonal, is held on trusts arising, whether
before or after the passing of this Act, under any will, settlement or other
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2002
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broad authority to terminate a trust or deviate from its terms, including
jurisdiction over both distributive and administrative provisions.60 Additionally,
the statute authorized the courts to act on behalf of minor, incompetent, and
unascertained beneficiaries. 6'

C. Missouri FollowsEngland'sLead
In 1983, Missouri deviated from the majority American position and
adopted the English approach to trust modification with the enactment of

disposition, the court may ifit thinksfit by order approve on behalf of(a) any person having, directly or indirectly, an interest, whether vested
or contingent, under the trusts who by reason of infancy or other incapacity
is incapable of assenting, or
(b) any person (whether ascertained or not) who may become entitled,
directly or indirectly, to an interest under the trusts as being at a future date
or on the happening of a future event a person of any specified description or
a member of any specified class of persons, so however that this paragraph
shall not include any person who would be of that description, or a member
of that class, as the case may be, if the said date had fallen or the said event
had happened at the date of the application of the court, or
(c) any person unborn, or
(d) any person in respect of any discretionary interest of his under
protective trusts where the interest of the principal beneficiary has not failed
or determined[,] any arrangement (by whomsoever proposed, and whether or
not there is any other person beneficially interested who is capable of
assenting thereto) varying or revoking all or any of the trusts, or enlarging the
powers of the trustees of managing or administering any of the property
subject to the trusts:
Provided that except by virtue of paragraph (d) of this subsection the
court shall not approve an arrangementon behalfof any person unless the
carryingout thereofwould befor the benefit of thatperson.
Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1(1) (1958) (Eng.) (emphasis added).
Although the language of the Missouri statute is taken directly from the English
Variation of Trusts Act, its scope is arguably much more narrow. In subsection (b), the
English Act requires a finding of a benefit to any person who may be directly or
indirectly entitled to distribution from the trust. Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2,
c. 53, § 1(1) (1958) (Eng.). The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of
Missouri, however, has limited the statutory language to mean that a court must find a
benefit only for those parties who are expressly mentioned in the trust instrument. See
infra notes 70-83 and accompanying text.
60. Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1(1) (1958) (Eng.); see also
Chester, supra note 17, at 713; supranote 52.
61. Variation of Trusts Act, 6 & 7 Eliz. 2, c. 53, § 1(1) (1958) (Eng.).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11
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Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2.62 Unlike the long-standing rule
expressed in Claflin,63 consideration of the settlor's intent is absent in the
Missouri provision, which is based, in significant part, upon the English
Variation of Trusts Act." The Missouri statute, however, expanded the role of
the courts beyond what the English Variation of Trusts Act authorized. Rather
than merely authorizing tribunals to act on behalf of beneficiaries, Missouri
courts must make a finding that deviation from the trust terms will benefit the
disabled, minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries, giving the provision the
effect of making the court an impromptu guardian ad litem."1 Moreover, the
statute fails to address which individuals fall within the scope of the term
"beneficiary" as used in Section 456.590.2,' and it does not distinguish between
economic and non-pecuniary benefits.67 Despite the imprecise nature of the

62. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
63. The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District of Missouri stated that
Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2 modified the Claflin rule in that:
[t]he statute provides a mechanism for "adult beneficiaries who are not
disabled," to vary, extend or eliminate a trust under circumstances where the
settlor's purpose is not considered. However, deviation is precluded when
certain classifications of protected beneficiaries exist and a court has not
found that those variations desired by the qualified adult beneficiaries would
benefit the protected beneficiaries.
Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d 434,436 (Mo. Ct. App.

1991).
64. See Wiedenbeck, supranote 35, at 812-15.
65. The language, "the court may, upon finding that such variation ill benefit the
disabled, minor, unborn and unascertained beneficiaries," presents an interpretive
dilemma. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000). To date, the courts in the two cases
interpreting it have appointed guardians ad litem to represent the interests of the unborn
and unascertained beneficiaries without much fanfare. See In re Trust of Nitsche, 46
S.W.3d 682, 683 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001); Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 436. This is
arguably an appropriate measure forthe court, but it may notbeprecisely what the statute
envisioned. Strictly read, the statute requires only afindingofa benefit. Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 456.590.2 (2000). Evidently, however, Missouri courts have determined that an
appropriate means to issue a finding of a benefit is to obtain a guardian's
recommendations. Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 436; see also Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d at 683.
66. Wiedenbeck, supra note 35, at 813.
67. Wiedenbeck, supra note 35, at 813.
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provision, s" there has been very little litigation concerning the statute; in fact,
only two Missouri cases have interpreted it.69
One of these cases, Hamerstromv. Commerce Bank ofKansas City, N.A.,"0
arose in much the same way as Thomson; however, Hamerstrom was a case of
first impression under the statute." Upon his death in 1966, the settlor
established a testamentary trust for the benefit of Elizabeth Hamerstrom.72
Under the trust's terms, Elizabeth was to receive $150 monthly allowance until
the corpus was exhausted or until her death.73 Upon her death, the trust was to
be terminated, and the corpus was to be distributed to her husband, should he
survive, or to their two sons in equal shares should their father predecease their
mother, Elizabeth.74 The instrument made no mention who would receive the
corpus if any of the contingent beneficiaries predeceased Elizabeth, the primary
beneficiary.75
Asserting that the trifecta of inflation, retirement, and increased health care
costs changed her circumstances significantly enough to warrant deviation from
trust terms, Elizabeth, with the consent of her sons and husband, petitioned the

68. Professor Wielenbeck has illuminated three potential difficulties in the
interpretation of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2. Wiedenbeck, supranote
35, at 813. First, the statute does not address whether the court has jurisdiction to order
a deviation where there are no disabled, minor, unborn, or unascertained beneficiaries,
and where the adult beneficiaries who are not disabled consent. Wiedenbeck, supranote
35, at 813. Second, the statute does not address how closely the additional benefit must
be to the settlor's original purpose. Wiedenbeck, supra note 35, at 813. Finally, the
statute does not address the extent to which the court is to consider the settlor's material
purpose. Wiedenbeck, supra note 35, at 813. Although Missouri courts have yet to
address these inquiries, the Hamerstrom case illuminated other problematic areas of the
interpretation of the statute. For instance, the courts effectively limited the class of
beneficiaries to "those persons, including unborn and unascertained issue, individually
named, or who are included in a named class, identified by the settlor in the testamentary
trust and for whom the settlor expressed an intent to make [the] provision." Hamerstrom,
808 S.W.2d at 438. Interpreting the statute in a way that would require the court to find
a benefit for unnamed beneficiaries would give the statute no substantive effect.
69. See infra note 83 and accompanying text.
70. 808 S.W.2d 434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991). See generally Becky Owenson
Kilpatrick, Missouri Takes a Stand: The Death of the Dead Hand in the Control of
Trusts, 57 Mo. L. REv. 1003 (1992).
71. Hamerstrom, 808 S.W.2d at 434.
72. Id. at 435.
73. Id. When Mrs. Hamerstrom filed the petition for deviation, the trust's value
was $425,000 with an annual income of approximately $26,000. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 437.
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court for a greater allowance.76 In finding that the trust could be varied under
Section 456.590.2," the court announced that an interpretation of the provision
mandated that the term "beneficiary" be given its "plain and ordinary
meaning."78 The language did not require the court to extend trust benefits to
individuals not named in the instrument. As there were no unnamed or
unascertained beneficiaries in the instant case, the requirements for modification
were satisfied because all of the named beneficiaries consented.7 9
Hamerstrom marked the initial statutorily-mandated departure from the
material purpose doctrine in Missouri. Accordingly, the courts began placing
more weight on the acquisition of beneficiaries' consent and the protection of
contingent beneficiaries."0 They gave no deference whatsoever to the settlor's
purpose.8 It would seem, then, that the statutory provision entirely did away
with the Claflin doctrine, the thrust of which is to give effect to the settlor's
material purpose. Conversely, the thrust of the Missouri statute is, where
necessary, to protect unrepresented classes of contingent beneficiaries.8 2 Given
that Missouri courts have examined the statute in only two cases,83 there has not
yet been an opportunity to illuminate its full meaning, and there may never be,
particularly if Missouri adopts the UTC.

Ill. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The increased use of trusts for estate planning and wealth management
purposes has inspired a movement toward uniformity in the law governing

76. Id. at 435. Mrs. Hamerstrom requested a monthly allowance of $2,000. Id.
77. Arguably, the facts in Hamerstrom demonstrate the provision's finite
application. If read strictly, the court would have no need to apply the statute in a
situation where the heirs or issue of beneficiaries are not mentioned in the instrument
itself. Absent such a situation, the court, as in the present case, merely deferred to the
traditional requirements of the unanimous consent ofthe competent, adult beneficiaries,
although it cited to Section 456.590.2 as its justification. See id. at 438; RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) oF TRUSTS § 337 (1) (1959).
78. Hamerstrom,808 S.W.2d at 437.
79. Id. at 438.
80. See generally Hamerstrom v. Commerce Bank of Kan. City, N.A., 808 S.W.2d
434 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991).
81. Arguably, under Section 456.590.2, securing a benefit for the unborn or
unascertained beneficiaries would constitute the settlor's material purpose.
82. Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).
83. In addition to Hamerstrom, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Southern
District of Missouri recently applied Section 456.590.2 in In re Trust of Nitsche.
However, this decision was very limited and made no contribution to the jurisprudence.
See In re Trust of Nitsche, 46 S.W.3d 682 (Mo. Ct. App. 2001).
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trusts." This increased use, coupled with the fact that trust law in many states
is "thin" at best, 5 presents the potential for copious litigation and more
fragmented policies.8 Previously, attorneys and courts have drawn guidance
from the Restatement, case law, and the voluminous writings of Scott and
Bogert. 7 While the treatises, restatements, and jurisprudence are not without
value, relying on these sources requires consulting a multitude of cites and, even
then, leaves many important issues unaddressed.8 Furthermore, the existing
uniform laws that relate to trusts, including the Uniform Probate Code, the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act and the Uniform Trusts Act, create more gaps in
the law than they fill. 9 Missouri differs in that it has a statute that clearly
liberalizes the law on trust modification and termination, but the extent of the
liberalization remains unclear.9 This lack of uniformity and completeness in the
law diminishes trusts' value as flexible and practical estate management
instruments. 91 In 1994, in order to remedy this problem, the National Conference
of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws appointed a drafting committee for
the UTC.' After six years of discussion, the Committee presented the
completed UTC in 2000 with the goal of providing the states "with precise,
comprehensive, and easily accessible guidance on trust law questions." 93

84. UTC prefatory note.
85. UTC prefatory note. Although collectively the states' jurisprudence is vague
and inconsistent, several states, including California, Georgia, Indiana, Texas, and
Washington, have developed comprehensive trust statutes. UTC prefatory note.
86. See UTC prefatory note.
87. See Chester, supra note 17, at 725; see also David M. English, The Uniform
Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions and Policy Issues, 62 Mo. L. REV. 143

(2002).
88. See Chester, supra note 17, at 725.
89. UTC prefatory note (describing the uniform laws dealing with trusts as
"fragmentary").
90. See supra notes 63-66.
91. See supra note 5; see also I AUSTIN W. SCOTT & WILLIAM FRANKLIN
FRATCHER, THE LAW OF TRUSTS 4 (4th ed. 1991) ("The purposes for which trusts can be
created are as unlimited as the imagination of lawyers.").
92. UTC prefatory note.
93. UTC prefatory note.
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A. DraftingInfluences
Statutes from various states influenced the preparation of the UTC;94
however, the California Probate Code, 9 which has separate provisions for court
alterations due to changed circumstances and for termination and modification
under the material purpose doctrine was most influential.96 The material purpose

94. UTC prefatory note.
95. California Probate Code Section 15409 deals with modification or termination
due to changed circumstances. It states:
(a) On petition by a trustee or beneficiary, the court may modify the
administrative or dispositive provisions of the trust or terminate the trust if,
owing to circumstances not known to the settlor and not anticipated by the
settlor, the continuation of the trust under its terms would defeat or
substantially impair the accomplishment ofthe purposes of the trust. In this
case, if necessary to carry out the purposes of the trust, the court may order

the trustees to do acts that are not authorized or are forbidden by the trust
instrument. (b)The court shall consider a trust provision restraining transfer
of the beneficiary's interest as a factor in making its decision whether to
modify or terminate the trust, but the court is not precluded from exercising
its discretion to modify or terminate the trust solely because of a restraint on
transfer.
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409 (West 1991).
California Probate Code Section 15403 deals with thebeneficiaries' rightto modify
or terminate trust terms. It states:
(a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), if all beneficiaries ofan irrevocable
trust consent, they may compel modification or termination ofthe trust upon
petition of the court. (b) If the continuation of the trust is necessary to carry
out the material purpose of the trust, the trust cannot be modified or
terminated unless the court, in its discretion, determines that the reason for
doing so under the circumstances outweighs the interest in accomplishing a
material purpose of the trust. Under this section, the court does not have
discretion to permit termination of a trust that is subject to a valid restraint of
transfer of the beneficiary's interest as provided in Chapter 2 (commencing
with section 15300).
CAL. PROB. CODE § 15403 (West 1991).
Note that Section 15403 essentially describes a balancing test between the material
purpose ofthe trust and the circumstances from which the petition to modify arose. The
UTC contains no such balanci-g test. See Chester, supra note 17, at 704. The
Restatement also authorizes a balancing test, stating that, where termination would be
inconsistent with the trust's material purpose, modification may be compelled upon the
court's finding that the reason for termination outweighs the settlor's material purpose.
RESTATEMENT(THIRD) OFTRUSTS § 65(2)

(Tentative DraftNo. 3,2001). Note, however,

that the balancing does not occur unless the settlor has died. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TRUSTS § 65(2) cmt. d (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001).
96. CAL.PROB. CODE § 15403 (West 1991).
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provision had the most influence on the UTC.97 In addition to the statutory
influences, the drafters based the UTC on the Restatement (Second) and
Restatement (Third) of Trusts,98 and it also incorporated various provisions of
existing uniform laws on trusts." Specifically, the provisions of Article 4 of the
UTC,' which govern trust modification and termination, were drafted to
augment flexibility in this area.'01
The California Probate Code's influence is apparent upon the drafting of
Article 4.1"2 Although the UTC does not require explicit counterbalancing
between the needs of the beneficiaries in light of changed circumstances and the
intent of the settlor, °3 harmonizing these two interests was the drafters' primary
goal. 4 The prefatory comments to the UTC indicate that the "overall objective
of the these sections is to enhance flexibility consistent with the principle that
preserving the settlor's intent is paramount."' 5 This deference is evinced by the
language of Section 411, which limits termination of a trust to circumstances
where the trust is no longer necessary to achieve the settlor's material purpose
or is not inconsistent with that material purpose." This language is significant,

97. David M. English, Is There a Uniform Trust Act in Your Future?,PROB. &
PROP., Jan. 2000, at 25.
98. Although the Restatement (Second) of Trusts had a sizable role in the
progression of the common law upon which the UTC is based, the drafters endeavored
to construct the UTC in such a way that it complements the Restatement (Third) of
Trusts. See UTC prefatory note.
99. UTC prefatory note.
100. In addition to governing trust modification and termination, Article 4
establishes the requirements concerning trust creation. UTC prefatory note. These
elements are based upon the traditional doctrine outlined in the Restatement (Second)
Section 23 and Restatement (Third) Section 13. UTC prefatory note. Furthermore,
Article 4 delineates noncharitable, charitable, and honorary trusts. UTC prefatory note.
101. UTC prefatory note.
102. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409(a) (West 1991).
103. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409(a) (West 1991).
104. UTC prefatory note.
105. UTC prefatory note.
106. Section 41 l(b) states in its entirety:
A noncharitable irrevocable trust may be terminated upon consent of all the
beneficiaries if the court concludes that continuance of the trust is not
necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust. A noncharitable
irrevocable trust may be modified upon consent of all the beneficiaries if the
court concludes that modification is not inconsistent with a material purpose
of the trust.
UTC § 411 (b); cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 (Tentative Draft No. 3,2001).
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particularly for Missouri practitioners, because it "carries forward" the rule
established in Claflin more than a century ago. 0 7
In addition to codifying the Claflin doctrine," 8 Section 411 is innovative in
that it resolves the ambiguity surrounding spendthrift provisions,' °9 which have
long been debated with regard to whether the settlor's desire to shield the trust
funds from the reach of creditors constitutes a material purpose."' If widely
adopted, the UTC would clarify this ambiguity. Subsection (c) of Section 411
unequivocally states that a spendthrift provision will not be presumed to be a
material purpose of the trust."' This result, though apparently contrary to the
generally accepted authority on the subject," 2 is a consequence of the nearly
universal practice ofincorporating a spendthrift provision without consideration
of the settlor's actual intent." 3 Otherwise, the use of boilerplate language
substantially would limit the beneficiaries' ability to terminate or modify, even
though the settlor had no such purpose.
IV. DISCUSSION
The design of the UTC provides for a more sophisticated analysis of the
settlor's purpose in creating the trust"4 by allowing modification where the
change is "not inconsistent with a material purpose of the trust""Is and allowing
termination where the court "concludes that continuance of the trust is not
necessary to achieve any material purpose of the trust."" 6 Additionally, it

107. UTC § 411(a) cmt.
108. UTC § 411(b) cmt.
109. UTC § 411(c).
110. ANDERSEN, supranote 2, § 13, at 114-19.
111. UTC § 411(c).
112. See TTC § 411 (c) cmt. (citing GEORGEG. BOGERT& GEORGET. BOGERT, THE
LAw OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 1008 (rev. 2d ed. 1992)); 4 AUSTIN W. SCOTT &
WILLiAMFRANKLiNFRATCHER,THELAWOFTRUSTS §337 (4th ed. 1989); see also Estate
of Harbaugh v. Harbaugh, 646 P.2d 489, 502 (Kan. 1982); Heritage Bank-North v.
Hunterdon Med. Center, 395 A.2d 552,554 (N.J. 1978); Germann v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co.,
331 S.E.2d 385, 387 (S.C. Ct. App. 1985).
113. UTC § 411 (c) cmt.; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 65 cmt. e
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2001) (stating that a spendthrift clause "may be included as a
routine or incidental provision of a trust (unimportant or even unknown to the settlor) as
a part of a trust established for tax purposes, merely to provide successive enjoyment or
for other reasons not inconsistent with allowing premature termination upon application
of all the beneficiaries").
114. UTC § 411(c) cmt.
115. UTC § 411(b).
116. UTC § 411(b).
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protects the interests of a deceased settlor, while allowing deviations to be made
within reason to ensure that the passage of time does not render the trust
distributions nominal.' 17 This phenomenon occurred inThomson,"' in which the
Missouri Supreme Court determined that the monthly disbursements, though a
fraction of what the beneficiary needed for maintenance, were sufficient because
they substantially comported with the settlor's intent. 19 In cases such as
Thomson, the UTC's requirement that the purpose for which deviation is
requested be "not inconsistent" with the original purpose of the trust certainly
would allow for greater disbursements where the beneficiary has become infirm,
has retired, or where inflation has rendered the trust income nominal. 2 The
UTC, if adopted, ideally would lessen the likelihood that decisions to withhold
disbursements would be rendered arbitrarily based upon a strict interpretation of
the word "intent."''
In light of these recent developments, inquiry into whether the UTC would
supersede the Missouri statute is warranted. The UTC unequivocally adopts the
Claflin doctrine," whereas Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2
superceded Claflin to the extent that the statutory language does not explicitly
inquire into the settlor's intent."z Otherwise, the statute fused the Restatement
requirement of unanimous beneficiary consent with the English Variation of
Trusts Act requirement of a benefit to unborn or unascertained beneficiaries."
A liberal reading of the Missouri statute, coupled with the appellate courts'
interpretation of the statute thus far, demonstrates deference to the settlor's
intent. Clearly, if the settlor named contingent remaindermen, he or she intended
for them to benefit. If the settlor had no such intent, no contingent beneficiaries
would have been named. The Missouri statute merely requires that the proposed
change will provide some benefit to the contingent remaindermen once the
modification is made."z Hence, the Missouri statute and the UTC are not
inherently incongruous. The UTC allows deviation where the beneficiaries

117. See generally UTC § 411 and accompanying comments.
118. See supra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
119. See supranotes 53-57 and accompanying text.
120. See UTC § 411 and accompanying comments.
121. Although the UTC has the ideal effect of increasing uniformity and honoring
the settlor's true intent, beneficiaries are saddled with a substantial restraint. The.UTC
provisions governing modification and termination are purely discretionary, and,
therefore, should the trial court produce a ruling adverse to the beneficiaries, the decision
would be difficult to overturn on appeal.
122. UTC § 411(a) cmt.
123. See Mo. REv. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).

124. See supranotes 57-61 and accompanying text.
125. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.2 (2000).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol67/iss2/11

18

Walker: Walker: Get Your Dead Hands Off Me:
2002]

MODIFICATIONOR TERMINATION AND THE UTC

461

consent and the settlor's intent will not be dishonored; 126 the statute permits
deviation where all beneficiaries consent and the proposed variation would
benefit the contingent remaindermen 27 Because the settlor's intent was not to
abandon the interests ofthe contingent remaindermen, finding a benefit for them
is consistent with the settlor's interests. Hence, though it differs from the
Missouri statute as to modification of trust terms, the UTC does not necessarily
offend the relevant provisions of Missouri law. Similarly, the UTC, though
based upon the California Probate Code and the Restatement (Third) ofTrusts,
differs somewhat from these drafting models.
The UTC differs from the California Probate Code and the Restatement
(Third)ofTrusts in that both explicitly require a counterbalancing ofthe settlor's
and beneficiaries' desires. 28 The UTC requires no such test.12 TheRestatement
envisions a modification doctrine that would allow deviation where there is a
compelling desire that is outside the parameters ofthe settlor's intent. Again, the
UTC protects the settlor more so than does the Restatement in that the UTC
defers to the beneficiaries only to the extent that the modification will effectuate
30
the settlor's intent.
The UTC, while substantially deferring to the settlor's intent, appears to
further dead hand control of the trust property in terms of an express material
purpose; however, it liberalizes the material purpose doctrine with regard to
spendthrift provisions.' 3 ' This is aninteresting choice by the drafters because the
majority of the UTC provisions codify traditional doctrine while the spendthrift
provision is totally inconsistent with traditional doctrine.' 32 Again, this decision
was meant to protect the settlor's interest, but it ultimately benefits the
beneficiaries. Spendthrift clauses are frequently added to a trust document as a
matter of course, and, where this is the case, it is arguable that restricting transfer
of the interest was not the settlor's intent. To ensure that the court effectuates
the settlor's intent, the trustee may offer extrinsic evidence that the spendthrift
provision was, in fact, a material purpose of the settlor.

126. UTC prefatory note, § 411 (b).
127. Mo. REV. STAT. § 456.590.3 (2000).
128. See CAL. PROB. CODE § 15409(a) (West 1991); supra note 95 and
accompanying text.
129. See Chester, supranote 17, at 705.
130. UTC prefatory note, § 411 (b).
131. See supranotes 108-13 and accompanying text.
132. See supra notes 108-13 and accompanying text.
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V. CONCLUSION
The cycle began in Missouri in 1956 when the Missouri Supreme Court
adopted the Claflinrule in Thomson.133 For twenty-seven years, this was the law
in Missouri, as it was in a majority of states. In 1983, however, the Missouri
General Assembly mandated the consideration of the needs of all classes of
beneficiaries with the adoption of Missouri Revised Statutes Section 456.590.2,
although the statute had no noticeable effect until Hamerstrom.
If the UTC is adopted, Missouri's law of trust modification will vacillate
back to where it began more than a century ago. In the interim, the courts and
legislature have had difficulty striking the appropriate balance between the
settlor's intent in creating the trust and the disfavored practice of restraining an
individual's freedom to alienate his or her property. The UTC has struck a
delicate balance that corrects the flaws in the traditional doctrines. While
allowing courts to deviate from trust provisions only with the beneficiaries'
consent, deviation is allowed only to the extent that it is not inconsistent with the
trust's material purpose. Ifthe UTC is adopted in Missouri, this provision would
preserve the purpose the settlor envisioned for the trust while allowing the
flexibility that was lost when the courts-fearing dead hand
control--overcompensated by affording the beneficiaries the power to undo the
settlor's purpose. This result is not only logical, but it is also fair to both settlors
and beneficiaries.
JULIA C. WALKER

133. Thomson v. Union Nat'l Bank in Kansas City, 291 S.W.2d 178 (Mo. 1956).
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